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Figure 1:We evaluate and discuss the suitability of using Virtual Reality (VR) to conduct human-centred usability and security
evaluations of real-world authentication systems. To this end, we replicated a recently introduced authentication scheme
called CueAuth [52] (➊) into VR (➋). We then evaluate the usability and security of our replica and compare the results to the
real-world evaluation of CueAuth [52].
ABSTRACT
Evaluating novel authentication systems is often costly and time-
consuming. In this work, we assess the suitability of using Virtual
Reality (VR) to evaluate the usability and security of real-world au-
thentication systems. To this end, we conducted a replication study
and built a virtual replica of CueAuth [52], a recently introduced
authentication scheme, and report on results from: (1) a lab-based
in-VR usability study (N=20) evaluating user performance; (2) an
online security study (N=22) evaluating system’s observation resis-
tance through virtual avatars; and (3) a comparison between our
results and those previously reported in the real-world evaluation.
Our analysis indicates that VR can serve as a suitable test-bed for
human-centred evaluations of real-world authentication schemes,
but the used VR technology can have an impact on the evaluation.
Our work is a first step towards augmenting the design and evalua-
tion spectrum of authentication systems and offers ground work
for more research to follow.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Usable Privacy and Security (USEC) researchers have proposed a
plethora of novel authentication schemes (e.g., [18, 19, 40, 52, 60,
105]). Developing and evaluating prototype authentication systems
often involves non-commodity hardware (e.g., special smartphone
prototypes [18], private near-eye displays [111], or eye trackers
[49]), and complex study setups (e.g., [7, Figure 3], [50, Figure 2]).
This makes corresponding usability and security evaluations of-
ten costly and time consuming. While there are infrastructures
that allow running online studies (e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk)
and result in valuable and inspiring privacy and security research
[7, 70, 84, 85], they are often not suitable for USEC research involv-
ing physical prototype systems. A promising emerging evaluation
paradigm is Virtual Reality (VR) studies [64, 89, 104]. VR studies
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allow researchers to conduct evaluations by having participants ex-
perience virtual replicas of real-world systems in an immersive VR
environment. VR studies can (a) reduce costs of studies evaluating
real-world authentication systems as researchers do not need to
build physical prototypes; (b) allow recruiting many and diverse
participants remotely, thereby increasing ecological validity in the
long run; and (c) reduce the need for face-to-face studies which
could be advantageous at times e.g., during pandemics.
However, we are a long way from being able to apply VR studies
for usable privacy and security research. As a first step, we aim to
investigate whether and how VR studies can complement usabil-
ity and security evaluations of real-world authentication systems.
For example, are we able to learn about users’ performance on a
real-world system by measuring their performance on a virtual
reality replica? Or does an authentication scheme’s vulnerability to
observation attacks when used in VR map to similar weaknesses if
used in the real world?
Determining which results from lab-based VR usability and se-
curity studies match those obtained from the real world can be
particularly valuable. If USEC researchers could quickly iterate and
evaluate their authentication prototypes in VR before real-world
deployment, they could save costs, time, effort, and could recruit
potentially larger and more diverse samples in the long run.
To see if a real-world study of an authentication scheme can
be similarly run in VR, we set out to do an alternative methods
replication study of CueAuth [52]. To accomplish this, we repli-
cated CueAuth in VR and evaluated it using two in-depth studies:
1) an in-lab VR usability study (N=20) using VR replicas of the
authentication approaches used in the CueAuth paper as well as
similar metrics and 2) an online security study (N=22) to study the
observation resistance of our VR replica under two threat models
as done in CueAuth [52]. We then compared the results from our
studies with the real-world results of CueAuth [52]. Our studies and
the comparisons with earlier work allow us to draw novel insights
about the strengths and weaknesses of VR studies for usability and
security evaluations of authentication schemes. The results suggest
that many findings are transferable to the real world. Measures
like entry accuracy, and users’ experience and perception of input
methods are largely similar across our lab-based VR studies and
the original real-world studies [52]. Perceived workload when pro-
viding input with touch and mid-air remained similar across both
study types, but not for eye gaze. Input with eye gaze was perceived
as less demanding in VR. A difference was also found in users’ entry
time when using touch, indicating that artificial artefacts such as
virtual hands can negatively impact users’ performance when the
technology is not mature enough to provide experiences similar to
reality. The other difference was found for eye gaze where input
was significantly faster in VR than in the real-world study because
of the better eye tracking conditions. Inline with the real-world
security study of CueAuth, observations against VR avatars during
authentications are more successful in threat models that involve
video recordings. Observation attacks on touch input are also more
accurate than on mid-air and eye gaze. We conclude by discussing
our validation and how VR studies could be applied to more general
usable privacy and security research in the future.
1.1 Contribution Statement
The contribution of this paper is threefold: (1) We propose the
idea of using Virtual Reality as a test-bed for usability and security
evaluations of real-world authentication systems. (2) We comple-
ment prior work that evaluated usability aspects in VR [64, 104]
by the first lab-based in-VR usability evaluation and the first on-
line security evaluation through recordings in VR of a real-world
authentication system and validate the use of VR through a compar-
ison with the real-world study [52]. (3) Finally, we derive lessons
learned to support researchers in designing, developing, and eval-
uating authentication systems of similar type in VR and discuss
potential follow-up research directions.
2 RELATEDWORK
To contextualise our work, we review evaluation methods and
revisit prior work focusing on VR as a study platform.
2.1 Empirical Evaluations
When it comes to the evaluation of research artefacts, researchers
apply different methods. There is an increasing consensus of ac-
cepted evaluation methods within the CHI community [9], with
lab studies being still the most popular evaluation method [11, 58].
Empirical evaluations span from small-scale lab studies [1, 20, 87]
to large-scale in-the-wild evaluations [15, 25, 106]. Lab studies are
suitable for evaluations in controlled settings to iteratively evaluate
systems in a cheap way [23]. A drawback is that they often do
not represent a natural context, resulting in a low external validity
[23, 37]. There are ongoing debates whether or not conducting in-
the-wild studies is worth the hassle to increase the external validity
[55, 56]. Although they are often considered to be the way-to-go
when aiming for evaluations in a natural environment [23], they
are often expensive and time-consuming [56]. Moreover, there are
many discussions around legal and ethical burdens when conduct-
ing this type of research, especially within privacy and security
research [26, 69]. Many USEC researchers therefore draw on online
studies to get to scale and increase external validity [25, 85]. There
is also a notion of an increase of using online platforms such as
Stack Overflow or PatchManagement.org to conduct security and
privacy research [44, 98]. The variety of these evaluation methods
shows, as Greenberg & Buxton put it, that there is no all-in-one
solution and evaluations are not “universal panaceas” [112].
2.2 Virtual Reality as an Evaluation Method in
Human-computer Interaction
HCI researchers recently started to look into alternative evaluation
methods to cope with different study requirements and challenges.
Recent work explored behaviour in front of public displays in VR,
and compared it to real-world behaviour to find many similarities
[64]. There is also work that compared conducting empirical stud-
ies online, in VR, in AR, in the lab, and in in-situ studies to find
that some findings are comparable across the methodologies while
responses to standardised questionnaires such as AttrakDif [39]
and ARI [30] yielded significantly different results [104]. Others
compared navigation methods in VR to the real world to find differ-
ences in e.g., navigation performance while there was no difference
in users’ route recognition rate across the two study types [89], or
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Figure 2: We replicated CueAuth’s setup into a VR room with a situated display that shows PIN-pads (➋-a,➌-a,➍-a) featuring
the cues [52]. To select a digit, the user responds to the cue displayed on its button. After selection, the cues are randomly
reshuffled. To enter “0” via touch in the shown example, the user makes a touch gesture to the right in the yellow box to
correspond to the yellow “0” button with a right-arrow (➋). To enter “1’ in mid-air, the user performs the gesture to the front
with their left (red) hand as the “1” button is red and has no arrows (➌). In eye gaze, each digit moves along a distinct trajectory,
allowing users to follow the movement with their eyes to make selections. To enter “0”, the user has to follow the diagonal
movement of the digit with their eyes (➍).
studied teaching and learning classical orientation and mobility
tasks for visually impaired people in VR [101]. There are several
additional works (e.g., [33, 73, 75, 91]) that emphasise the potential
of using VR as a research platform.
2.3 Lessons Learnt from Prior Work
Prior work asserts that there is no “Swiss Knife” study method.
The choice of study method should in general evolve from the
actual problem and the research questions [34, 92]. VR has the
potential to act as a research paradigm to complement widely-used
study methods such as lab, online, and field studies. Prior work
also suggests that users behave similarly in VR as they do in the
real world [64, 73, 104], indicating a high transferability of findings
collected in VR to the real world. Yet, to date, it is unclear to what
extent results of usability and security evaluations of authentication
schemes fully conducted in VR are transferable to the real world.
While previous work focused mostly on comparing user behaviour
in front of public displays in VR and the real world [64] or assessed
smart artefacts through standardised questionnaires [104], less is
known about the transferability of quantitative measures such as
entry accuracy, entry time, and observation resistance from VR
to the real world. A validation of the use of VR for evaluating
authentication schemes allows the USEC community to leverage
this opportunity and identify when it is useful to employ VR studies.
3 RESEARCH PREFACE
Research in USEC covers a wide range of areas, many of which
are not necessarily easy to create in-lab experiments for. Our work
focuses on authentication because it is a major theme in USEC
research [27] and novel authentication scheme research often in-
volves physical prototypes (e.g., [18, 71]) as well as complex study
setups to asses a system’s security (e.g., [7, Fig. 3], [47, Fig. 2]).
We replicated CueAuth [52] because: (1) it covers a range of input
methods that are used in security research (touch [19, 107], mid-air
[1, 6], and eye gaze [20, 46, 61]); (2) it provides a holistic usability
and security evaluation; and (3) its underlying concept has already
been studied in different contexts [52, 105, 108].
3.1 CueAuth: An Overview
CueAuth [52] is an authentication system on situated displays such
as vending machines, ATMs, and other public displays in social
spaces. Providing input on CueAuth [52] is considered to be fast
and highly secure against observations. To enter a PIN, users either
perform touch gestures, mid-air gestures, or smooth pursuit eye
movements [103]. The underlying concept of CueAuth [52] is based
on cues on the screen (Figure 2-➋a,➌a,➍a). For touch and mid-air,
arrows on the respective digits show the users which gestures they
have to provide to enter the corresponding digit. The absence of
an arrow indicates that users have to tap (in touch) or perform a
gesture towards the front (in mid-air). In eye gaze, CueAuth [52]
employs Pursuits [103], a calibration-free gaze interaction method.
Smooth pursuit eye movements are compared to the trajectories of
animated targets (i.e., digits 0 - 9) to determine which digit users
gaze at. In all three input methods, the cues are randomly reshuffled
after every input and all input concepts are inline with the ones
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used in the original real-world evaluation of CueAuth [52]. We
describe the concept of each input method below.
3.1.1 Touch. To provide input via touch users need to observe
which cue is shown on the digit (e.g., see Figure 2-2a) and then
perform the corresponding touch gesture in the respective box, i.e.,
digits on the left are entered in the red box (i.e., 1,2,4,5,7) and digits
on the right (i.e., 3,6,8,9,0) are entered in the yellow box. Note that
an arrow means a touch gesture to the displayed direction (e.g., an
arrow to the left means a swipe gesture to the left). To select the
digit “3” in Figure 2-2a users need to make a down touch gesture
in the yellow box.
3.1.2 Mid-Air. In mid-air, users raise their hands and select digits
via mid-air gestures in the direction of the corresponding arrow
(e.g., see Figure 2-3a). Similar to touch, the gestures are performed
with the left hand if the digit is coloured red and with the right hand
if the digit is coloured yellow. To enter the digit “3” in Figure 2-3a
users need to make a gesture to the right with their right hand.
3.1.3 Eye Gaze. Contrary to touch and mid-air where users per-
form gestures based on the arrows, in eye gaze users need to follow
moving targets with their eyes (Pursuits [103]). The advantages
of Pursuits [103] over location-based gaze gestures are manifold.
For example, the input does not require accurate gaze estimation;
thus, does not require eye tracker calibration, which reduces the
pre-interaction time to a minimum. Pfeuffer et al. [79] showed that
calibration impacts the usability and user experience in a negative
way when interacting with public displays as such interactions are
often rather of shorter duration [74]. To, for example, select the
digit “0” in Figure 2-4a users need to follow the diagonally moving
target with their eyes.
3.2 Overview of Studies
Similar to the original real-world study of CueAuth [52], we used a
repeated measures design for both the usability and security study.
Conditions were counter-balanced using a Latin Square. We re-
cruited new participants for each study — no participant took part
in more than one study. Both studies are designed as conceptual
replications using “alternative methods” [110]. The in-VR usability
study was conducted in-person using equipment we provided to
ensure consistency of study environment and protocol between
participants. In future work we would be interested to see how
consistent the results are with participant-owned equipment in
their own homes as the increased adoption of new technologies
means that many households will likely have access to VR in the
near future [22], but we were concerned that doing so here might
add unnecessary variance. We used in-VR questionnaires to ensure
a consistent VR experience and not break participants’ focus [5, 81],
doing so also makes the methodology more applicable to poten-
tial future studies running fully remotely. The recruitment of the
usability study considered the same user profiles as the original
real-world study [52], i.e., users with normal/corrected-to-normal
vision and no prior experience with cue-based authentication. We
conducted the security study online through Prolific [80] using
pre-recorded videos recorded in the VR environment. Prolific is an
established platform for online subject recruitment for scientific
purposes and considered to be a valuable alternative to other crowd-
sourcing platforms and is regularly used for advertising academic
studies in HCI and USEC (e.g., [3, 66]). We embedded recordings
of authentications in VR (e.g., see Figure 2-3/3a) in Qualtrics, an
online survey tool that can be accessed via web browsers. This
depicts the same procedure used in the original real-world study
[52] where participants were showed video recordings of authenti-
cations in the real world, but in our case we used video recordings
of authentications performed in the virtual environment through
a virtual avatar. Using recordings of authentications to assess a
system’s resistance to observations is a commonly used approach
in usable privacy and security research [8, 18, 19, 47]. We applied
a pre-screening to ensure that participants of the online security
study have English proficiency and access to a PC. Finally, the re-
sults from the usability and security study were compared with the
real-word results observed in the CueAuth paper [52].
3.2.1 Ethics and Compensation. Our studies were approved by
the College of Science and Engineering Ethics Committee at the
University of Glasgow and consent was obtained prior to both
studies. We compensated participantsAC15.00 for the usability study
and £7.50 for the security study. Participants of the security study
also took part in a draw to receive an additional £7.50 based on their
observation performance. This compensation method was also used
in CueAuth [52] and is commonly used to motivate participants
in security studies [29, 67, 68]. Participants could optionally share
photos of any notes they took during the security study for an
additional compensation of £0.5.
3.3 Apparatus and Implementation
We implemented our VR prototype using Unity3D C#, Leap Motion
SDK [72] for the finger tracking, and Tobii XR SDK [102] for eye
tracking. We used the HTC VIVE Tobii DEV KIT [100] which we
connected to a VR-ready laptop (Razer Blade 15, NVIDIA GeForce
RTX 2080) [83]. The used VR headset comes with an integrated
Tobii eye tracker (120 Hz).
3.3.1 Implementation. We aimed for similar implementations as
used in the original study [52]. Due to the nature of VR some
implementations differ, but the overall concepts remain the same.
Touch. Instead of calculating the distance between on-screen
touch points to detect touch gestures as done in CueAuth [52],
we used colliders and the OnCollisionEnter, OnCollisionStay, and
OnCollisionExit event listeners [99] around user’s touch point. One
collider was positioned at user’s initial touch point and the others
(left/right/top/bottom) ≈3.5 cm away; this value is based on pilot
tests. A touch gesture is registered depending on which collider the
user’s finger collides with. If none of the colliders on the side are
touched, but the touch exits the collider at user’s initial touch point,
the system recognises a tap. Instead of providing haptic feedback
to simulate touching a screen in VR through, for example, electrical
muscle stimulation [63] or haptic gloves [43], we location-mapped
a physical surface to the in-VR screen to make users touch the
physical surface when performing touch gestures on the virtual
surface of the screen (Figure 3). This is inspired by the work of Kim
et al. [54].
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Figure 3: Wemapped a physical surface in the real world (➊)
to the virtual screen (➋) in the virtual environment. Follow-
ing this approach provides users with haptic feedback when
touching the screen without using an actual touchscreen.
Mid-Air: Instead of trackingmid-air gestures through an external
device as done in the real-world study with a Microsoft Kinect One,
we attached two HTC VIVE trackers to users’ wrist. The default
position is where users’ hands are raised and parallel to the elbows
(see virtual avatar in Figure 2-3). A small threshold area (10 cm,
determined through pilot tests) around the default position was
defined as “no-input area”. Gestures were detected using colliders
the same way we did for touch. After each gesture, users’ hands
had to return to the default position before the next input.
Eye Gaze: As done in the original CueAuth paper [52], we use
the implementation by Vidal et al. [103] to detect smooth pursuits.
A moving digit, used as stimulus for Pursuits [103], is selected if the
correlation between its trajectory and the user’s eye movements
exceeds a Pearson correlation coefficient threshold. The stimulus
with the highest correlation above the pre-defined threshold to
the user’s eye movements is defined as the stimulus at which a
user gazes at. The threshold (>0.8) as well as the trajectories of
the stimuli (circular, linear diagonal, and zigzag) are based on the
original study [52]. Different configurations of thresholds could
lead to different results in terms of entry accuracy and entry speed
[103] – we therefore did not fine-tune the threshold and used the
same as in the original real-world study [52].
3.4 Statistical Analysis and Data Visualisation
Our statistical analysis entails (1) an analysis of the repeated mea-
sures usability and security VR studies; and (2) a comparison be-
tween our VR experiment’s results and those obtained from the
original real-world study of CueAuth. The latter feeds our discus-
sion of the validity of VR studies in USEC research. To visualise our
data we use bar charts and violin plots [41], displaying a rotated
kernel density plot on either side of a box plot that shows the mean
and standard deviation. We colour-code the main observations re-
lated to comparing VR and real-world studies by green, orange, and
red to denote a high (■), intermediate (■), and low (■) match in
the results.
3.4.1 VR Study Analysis. In all our statistical analyses, we applied
the same tests as used in the original work [52]. We use repeated
measures ANOVAs (IV: input method) in the usability study and
two-way repeated measures ANOVAs (IV: input method, threat
model) in the security study. We checked our data for normal-
ity prior to the analysis. We applied ANOVAs to parametric and
normal/near-normal distributed data as ANOVAs are robust to
deviations from normality [32]. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons
were Bonferroni corrected for controlling familywise errors. Green-
house–Geisser adjustment was used to correct for violations of
sphericity. For qualitative analysis we used a code book [88] based
on the findings of CueAuth [52] to support comparison. We also
added a VR code to capture VR-related comments that were ob-
viously not present in the original real-world usability study. We
kept an eye out for potential new codes, but did not observe any.
The content was fairly simplistic, so one author did all the coding.
3.4.2 Validation Analysis. To assess the validity of our VR stud-
ies, we used between-group analysis to compare our studies to the
real-world evaluation of CueAuth, whose full dataset was obtained
through the original paper’s first author [52]. We applied two-way
mixed ANOVAs with one between-subjects factor (study type: VR
vs real world) and one within-subjects factor (input method) in the
usability study and three-way mixed ANOVAs with one between-
subjects factor (study type) and two within-subjects factors (input
method and threat model) in the security study.While this approach
allows us to reveal significant differences between the two study
types, a non-significant outcome (i.e., p-value > 0.05) does not indi-
cate that the values are equal or there is no effect of study type on
the measures [45]. The sample size in our VR studies is determined
by the original CueAuth study [52]. Such sample sizes increase
the likelihood of type-2 errors for statistical tests. Therefore, in
addition to reporting non-statistically significant pairs between the
real-world study and our VR study, we also report similar patterns
across the two study types.
4 STUDY 1: IN-VR USABILITY STUDY
Our study design follows the real-world study of CueAuth [52] as
much as possible. We had the input method as our only independent
variable, with three levels: (1) touch; (2) mid-air; and (3) eye gaze.
4.1 Procedure and Task
Each participant went through three blocks in total, one per con-
dition. Participants first filled in demographics followed by one of
the three interfaces (Figure 2). Prior to each block, we explained the
input method. Participants then performed training runs to become
acquainted with the corresponding input method. We excluded all
training runs from the analysis. Our system verbally announced
each 4-digit PIN which we pre-defined in advance. Each partic-
ipant had one chance to enter each PIN. After entering 16 PINs
per condition, participants filled in in-VR questionnaires [4, 81].
The same was repeated for the other methods. We concluded with
semi-structured interviews guided by the results from the original
study [52].
4.2 Results
We recruited 20 participants (8 female, 12male, self-reported) through
social media, word-of-mouth, and local societies. Our participants
were on average 27.25 years (range: 18 - 57, SD=8.31) and their de-
mographics (gender, age) correspond roughly to the demographics
of the participants in the real-world study (13 female participants,
ages ranging from 18 to 33 years (M=24.1, SD=3.9) [52]). We mea-
sured entry accuracy, entry time, and the perceived workload using
NASA-TLX [38]. We excluded the data of five participants (vs three
5









































Figure 4: Users authenticate significantly faster when using touch or mid-air in the VR study compared to eye gaze. However,
there is no evidence that touch in VR is faster than mid-air, or vice versa. This is slightly different from the real-world’s
study where touch was significantly faster than mid-air and eye gaze. Note that the red pointrange denotes mean ± standard
deviation.
in the real-world study [52]) due to tracking issues. Three (P3, P4,
P16) in the touch, and two (P14, P18) in the mid-air condition.
4.2.1 Entry Accuracy. We found a significant main effect of input
method on entry accuracy, F1.451,20.311= 5.791, p<0.05. Post-hoc
pairwise comparisons revealed significant differences (p<0.05) in
entry accuracy between touch (M=89.97%, SD=8.10%) and mid-
air (M=80.42%, SD=6.19%). No significant differences were found
between the other pairs. Entry accuracies are high for all methods
with 89.97% (SD=8.10%) for touch, 83.75% (SD=9.68%) for eye gaze,
and 80.42% (SD=6.19%) for mid-air. When comparing our results to
the original real-world study, no statistically significant interaction
(inputmethod× and study type) was found in case of entry accuracy,
F2,62 = 0.401, p = 0.671. There was also no main effect of study type
on entry accuracy, F1,31 = 0.058, p = 0.812. However, while touch
input was significantly more accurate than eye gaze in the real-
world study [52], this was not the case in our VR study.
Observation #1 [Entry Accuracy]: We did not find any sig-
nificant differences of entry accuracies between our VR study
and the original real-world study. This means that there is no
evidence that entry accuracy when providing input with touch,
mid-air, and eye gaze differs between the two study types.
4.2.2 Entry Time. We found a significant main effect of input
method on entry time, F1.229,15.972 = 69.778, p<0.05. Significant dif-
ferences (p<0.05) were found between eye gaze (M=16.75 s, SD=4.36 s)
and touch (M=6.06 s, SD=1.87 s), and between eye gaze (M=16.75 s,
SD=4.36 s) and mid-air (M=5.54 s, SD=1.16 s). This means that PIN
entries in touch are significantly faster than in eye gaze, which
matches the results from the real-world study [52]. Whereas touch
was also significantly faster than mid-air in the real-world study,
this was not the case in our VR study. No significantly different
entry times were found for mid-air and touch. Figure 4 shows the
distributions. When comparing the entry times to the original real-
world study, we found a significant interaction effect (study type
× input method), F1.054,31.614 = 13.908, p<0.05. Follow-up analysis
revealed a statistically significant difference in entry time when
using touch between our VR and the real-world study, F1,33 = 24.617,
p<0.05. Touch input was significantly faster in the original study
(M=3.73 s, SD=0.98 s) than in our VR study (M=6.06 s, SD=1.87 s).
The other was found for eye gaze, F1,35 = 15.728, p<0.05. Input
with eye gaze was significantly faster in our VR study (M=16.75 s,
SD=4.36 s vs M=26.35 s, SD=22.09 s). No significant difference be-
tween the study types was found for mid-air (M=5.54 s, SD=1.16 s
vs M=5.51 s, SD=3.87 s).
Observation #2 [Entry Time]: Touch input was significantly
faster in the original real-world study than in the VR study,
whereas eye gaze was significantly faster in the VR study than
in the real-world study. Entry time using mid-air remained the
same across both study types.
4.2.3 Perceived Workload. We did not find any statistically sig-
nificant differences of the mean raw NASA-TLX values between
the input methods, F2,38 = 0.389, p=0.681. The overall task load
indexes are 34.83 (SD=23.61), 34.0 (SD=19.68), and 30.33 (SD=18.33)
for touch, mid-air, and eye gaze in VR. We ran multiple repeated
measures ANOVAs on the level of each NASA-TLX dimension to
investigate if there is an effect between the input methods on the
level of each NASA-TLX dimension. A significant main effect was
found for input method on performance, F2,38 = 7.615, p < 0.05.
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference
between eye gaze and touch (p<0.05) and eye gaze and mid-air
(p<0.05). Figure 5-VR shows the mean scores and the pairs that are
significantly different.
When comparing users’ perceived workload in our VR study to
the real-world study, a two-way mixed ANOVA revealed a signifi-
cant interaction effect (study type × input method), F2,76 = 7.233, p
< 0.05. There was a statistically significant difference in users’ per-
ceived workload when using eye gaze between the two study types,
F1,38 = 7.803, p < 0.05. Follow-up analysis revealed a significant dif-
ference (p<0.05) between eye gaze in the two study types in terms
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Figure 5:We did not find any significant differences within our VR study between themean rawNASA-TLX values on the level
of the input methods, indicating that users perceived all three methods equally demanding. However, analysing each dimen-
sion revealed a significant difference (p<0.05) between touch and eye gaze, and mid-air and eye gaze in terms of performance.
Eye gaze in the real-world study (RW) was perceived as more demanding than in VR. Note that black lines denote the 95%
confidence interval (CI).
of physical workload, frustration, and effort. For our VR study the
mean raw values for physical workload, frustration, and effort are
18.50 (SD=21.83), 29.25 (SD=29.79), and 40.0 (SD=27.96). For the real-
world study the values are 46.5 (SD=26.71), 39.25 (SD=29.44), and
57.75 (SD=24.73). We did not find any other significant differences.
Observation #3 [PerceivedWorkload]: There is no evidence
that users’ perceived workload differs in terms of touch and
mid-air in both the real-world study and the VR study. However,
participants self-reported significantly lower physical workload,
less frustration, and less effort when providing input with eye
gaze in VR.
4.2.4 Qualitative Feedback. We collected feedback through loosely
guided semi-structured interviews (see Appendix A.1). We tran-
scribed the interview data and used the code book [88] based on
the findings in CueAuth [52] to tie the comments voiced in our VR
study to the original real-world study. Additionally, we report on
the perceived impact of VR on users’ behaviour. Although a strict
comparison of qualitative data is challenging [31], we can see many
similarities.
Exposure to the Input Methods: Similar to comments voiced
in the real-world study, the VR study participants also reported
being exposed previously to touch input (e.g., smartphones) and
mid-air gestures (e.g., Xbox video game console), but were less
exposed to gaze-based interaction, which was experienced by only
two participants before.
Perception of the Input Methods: Participants perceptions of
the methods in VR matched those from the real-world study. While
their ranking (see Section 4.2.5) suggests that they preferred eye
gaze over mid-air and touch, they associated touch with more posi-
tive attributes than eye gaze. Examples include intuitive, realistic,
and effortless. Although mid-air gestures were similarly positive
perceived, there were also more negative attributes associated com-
pared to touch. Mid-air gestures require more explicit movements
than touch and look weird. P13 thought (“[mid-air is] neither fish
nor fowl” ). Gaze was perceived as long-winded and exhausting, but
perceived safer than touch and mid-air. Input with mid-air and eye
gaze was also described as hygienic.
Usability: We received mixed comments about the usability
of each method. Touch was found simple and familiar. However,
participants also voiced that providing touch gestures with virtual
hands feels strange. While some participants perceived mid-air ges-
tures as comfortable, others mentioned that it feels weird in public:
“looks like a jumping jack”, P17. Gaze was perceived as long-winded,
but secure. This suggests that touch input was perceived slightly
more usable than mid-air and eye gaze. However the additional
technological layer (=the virtual hand) was taken negatively. This
deemphasises the advantages of touch input that were dominant in
the real-world study [52] due to VR components (Figure 6-VR/RW).
Enhancement: Participants voiced the lack of proper feedback
when entering a PIN and suggested to extend the interaction space
of mid-air gestures through finger or face gestures. Similar en-
hancements were also mentioned by participants in the original
real-world study [52]. Others mentioned technological limitations
in finger tracking and gesture detection. In terms of eye gaze, par-
ticipants criticised the pixelated targets they had to follow with
their eyes.
Perception of VR: Most participants voiced that the virtual en-
vironment did not impact the way they interacted with the system.
However, others mentioned that they felt isolated in VR which
allowed them to pay more attention to the task than they would
7




























Input using touch/mid−air/eye gaze is ...RW
Figure 6: Participants in our VR study rated the three input methods on 5-point Likert scales, from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5
(Strongly Agree). RW shows the results from the original real-world study [52]. Note that black lines denote the 95% confidence
interval (CI).
in the real world. P13 even said that she was totally unaware of
experimenter’s presence during the study. P19 mentioned that he
was inhibited to make specific movements because of being afraid
of bumping into real-world obstacles. P20’s opinion was different.
He voiced that he treated the VR environment as a safe space and
therefore felt “freer” to perform gestures. Participants described
people in the real-world as “additional noise” that is not present in
VR. P6 said the room was “too clean to be realistic”.
Overall, our interviews represent a similar picture as partici-
pants’ answers to our Likert questions (Figure 6). Compared to
participants’ qualitative feedback in the real-world study, touch
input was perceived as, for example, more challenging and more
error-prone in our VR study than in the real-world study. These
results can be attributed to the finger tracking used in our VR study
that we discuss further in Section 6.1.
Observation #4 [Qualitative Feedback]: Most feedback is
similar across the VR and real-world study. However, the differ-
ent sensing capabilities impacted participants’ perception and
preference of some methods.
4.2.5 Ranking. We asked participants to rank their preference of
the three inputmethods. Raw scores weremultiplied by their weight
factor: ×3 for rank 1, ×2 for rank 2, ×1 for rank 3, and then summed
up to compute weighted scores (based on [96]). Eye gaze was the
most preferred one (45), followed by mid-air (41), and touch (37).
Observation #5 [Ranking]: In contrast to the real-world study
where touch was the most preferred and eye gaze the least pre-
ferred input method, users in the VR study preferred eye gaze
over mid-air and touch.
5 STUDY 2: REMOTE EVALUATION OF THE
SYSTEM’S RESISTANCE TO OBSERVATIONS
THROUGH VR RECORDINGS
For the security evaluation, we designed a study in which partic-
ipants took the role of an attacker with the aim to attack 4-digit
PINs entered by a virtual avatar (Figure 2). We used Qualtrics [82]
and Prolific [80] to deploy the study online (see also Section 3.2).
5.1 Threat Models
We considered the two threat models used in the original real-world
study [52]. In both models, the attacker knows how the system
works and has an optimal view on user’s input. Single attack:
The attacker has only one chance to observe the authentication;
Repeated-video attack: The attacker can watch a video recording
of the authentication as often as they wish. They can pause, rewind,
slow down, and speed up the video.
5.2 Procedure and Task
Participants, which we refer to as attackers, were introduced to the
threat models and the input methods through explainer videos. We
added control questions after each introduction where they had
to guess a single-digit entry based on a given picture of the au-
thentication scheme and the VR avatar’s interaction to ensure they
understand how input using each method works. We navigated
them back to the explainer videos if they did not pass the control
questions. Each block then displayed 8 PINs, 4 for each threat model.
No participant attacked the same PIN more than once. Participants
could provide up to three guesses and rate their confidence in their
guess using a 5-point Likert scale. We concluded with a question-
naire and a file upload where participants could upload any notes
they took.
5.3 Results
We recruited 22 participants (10 female, 12 male). They were on
average 25.82 years (range: 19 - 45, SD=7.77). Compared to the real-
world study of CueAuth, our sample is slightly more diverse (45.45%
female participants vs 18.18% female participants, self-reported).
Participants’ age in both studies is almost identical with an average
age of 25.82 years in our replication study and 26.9 in the original
real-world study [52]. We analysed their successful attack rate, the
Levenshtein distance between users’ correct and attackers’ clos-
est guess, attackers’ attack duration, and their level of confidence
when performing observation attacks. We excluded the data of 6
participants (vs two in the real-world study [52]) as it was clear
they did not put reasonable effort in the attacks (0 out of 24 attacks
were successful). We discuss this decision further in Section 6.2.
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Table 1: Single attacks against mid-air and eye gaze resulted in 0 successful attacks. Only 10.95% were successful on touch.
Although repeated-video attacks were equally successful for touch and mid-air (59.38%), the Levenshtein distance shows that
attacks on touch were closer to the correct PIN. Participants’ level of confidence (1=not confident at all, 5=very confident) re-
mained the same across the threat models in eye gaze, but repeated-video attacks significantly increased attackers’ confidence
in touch and mid-air.
Single attack Repeated-video attack
Success Distance Confidence Duration Success Distance Confidence Duration
Touch 10.95% 2.03 1.74 103.00 s 59.38% 0.59 4.34 150.98 s
Mid-air 0.00% 2.94 1.33 79.68 s 59.38% 0.83 4.53 138.80 s
Eye Gaze 0.00% 3.55 1.06 63.48 s 0.00% 3.45 1.09 150.54 s
5.3.1 Successful Attack Rate. In the single attack threat model, only
a few attacks (10.95%, SD=18.19%) on touch were successful. Not a
single attack was successful against mid-air and eye gaze. When
attackers were able to rewind the videos, slightly more than half
of the attacks on touch (59.38%, SD=22.12%) and mid-air (59.38%,
SD=27.2%) were successful, but not a single one on eye gaze. We
found a significant effect of the threat model, F1,15 = 125.952, p<0.05,
and the input method, F1.340,20.097 = 37.426, p<0.05, on attackers’
attack rate. We also found a significant interaction effect (threat
model × input method), F2,30 = 30.829, p<0.05. While follow-up
analysis revealed a significant difference of the attack rates between
the input methods in the single threat model, F2,30 = 5.787, p<0.05,
post-hoc pairwise comparisons did not confirm these differences.
In the repeated-video attack threat model, attacks on touch (59.38%)
and mid-air (59.38%) were significantly more successful (p<0.05)
than on eye gaze (0%). No other pairs were significant different. The
same pairs were significantly different in the original CueAuth pa-
per [52]. When comparing attackers’ attack rate between the study
types, we found no statistically significant three-way interaction
effect (study type × input method × threat model), F2,68 = 2.065, p
= 0.135, and no statistically significant two-way interaction (study
type × input method), F2,68 = 2.710, p = 0.074; (study type × threat
model), F1,34 = 0.113, p = 0.738.
Inline with CueAuth’s real-world evaluation [52], our analysis
revealed that repeated-video attacks on a VR avatar when providing
input with touch and mid-air were more successful than on eye
gaze. No differences between the input methods were found for
single attacks in both our replication study and in the real-world
study. However, it should be noted that single attacks on touch
were to 10.9% successful in our replication study, while in the real-
world study they were not successful at all (0%) [52]. The other was
found in repeated-video attacks on touch with 59.38% successful
attacks in our replication study and 74% in the real-world study [52].
The values of mid-air and eye gaze in our replication study match
more accurately with the real-world study results [52]. Results are
summarised in Table 1 and Table 2.
Observation #6 [Attack Rate]: Successful attack rates against
VR avatars are largely similar to attacks against real users as
done the original study. There is no evidence that attackers
performed better when attacking a real-world user compared to
a virtual avatar, and vice versa.
5.3.2 Levenshtein Distance. As done in CueAuth [52], we calcu-
lated the Levenshtein distances [62] between the correct PIN and
the attacker’s closest guess to it. We found a significant effect of
the threat model, F1,15 = 88.679, p<0.05, and input method, F2,30 =
170.284, p<0.05, on the Levenshtein distance. We also found a signif-
icant interaction effect (threat model× input method), F2,30 = 46.126,
p<0.05. Follow-up analysis revealed a significant effect of input
method on the Levenshtein distance in case of single attacks, F2,30
= 30.551, p<0.05. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed signifi-
cant differences between all three input methods (p<0.05). Between
touch (M=2.03, SD=1.07) and eye gaze (M=3.55, SD=0.56), touch
(M=2.03, SD=1.07) and mid-air (M=2.94, SD=1.03), and eye gaze
(M=3.55, SD=0.56) and mid-air (M=2.94, SD=1.03). We also found a
significant effect of input method on the Levenshtein distance in
case of repeated-video attacks, F2,30 = 335.889, p<0.05. Post-hoc pair-
wise comparisons revealed a significant difference between touch
(M=0.59, SD=0.63) and eye gaze (M=3.45, SD=0.71), and mid-air
(M=0.83, SD=0.86) and eye gaze (M=3.45, SD=0.71). No significant
difference was found between touch and mid-air. Repeated-video at-
tacks did not improve users’ attacks on eye gaze, but when attacking
touch and mid-air input (p<0.05). When comparing the Levenshtein
distances of attackers’ guesses to the original real-world study, we
found a statistically significant three-way interaction effect (study
type × input method × threat model), F2,68 = 11.122, p<0.05 and a
statistically significant two-way interaction (method × study type),
F2,68 = 15.621, p<0.05. Single-attacks on eye gaze in the real-world
study were statistically significant closer (p<0.05) to the correct
PINs (M=2.81, SD=0.76 vs M=3.55, SD=0.32), whereas single-attacks
on touch input were closer (p<0.05) to the correct PINs in our
replication study (M=2.03,SD=0.77 vs M=2.83,SD=0.67). In repeated-
video attacks, guesses on eye gaze where statistically significant
closer to the correct PINs in the real-world study (M=2.63, SD=0.72
vs M=3.45, SD=0.31). No other significant differences were found.
The differences within our replication study in the single-atack
threat model are not inline with the real-world study. However,
in repeated-video attacks, attacks on touch and mid-air were both
significantly closer to the correct PINs than on eye gaze, which is
inline with the real-world study. Both our VR and the real-world
study [52] suggest that repeated-video attacks improved attackers’
performance in all three input methods.
Observation #7 [Levenshtein Distance]: Attacks on mid-air
were equally close in both study types, whereas attacks on eye
gaze were more accurate in the real-world study. Attackers in the
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replication study performed significantly closer single-attacks
on touch input compared to the single-attacks in the real-world
study. In both the real-world study and the replication study,
repeated-video attacks were more successful on touch and mid-
air than on eye gaze.
5.3.3 Attack Duration. When assessing attackers’ attack duration,
we found no effect of the inputmethod on attack duration F1.241,16.130
= 0.115, p = 0.792. The values for touch, mid-air, and eye gaze are
M=150.98 (SD=65.83), M=138.80 (SD=44.68), andM=150.54 (SD=33.19).
When comparing the attack durations to the original real-world
study, we found no statistically significant interaction effect (study
type × input method) on attack duration, F1.296,44.049 = 1.938, p =
0.168. In both study types, attacks on mid-air were fastest. However,
in the real-world study attacks on mid-air were also significantly
faster than eye gaze. This was not the case in our replication study.
All other pairs match – there were no significant differences be-
tween touch and mid-air, and touch and eye gaze in the real-world
study of CueAuth [52] and in our replication study.
Observation #8 [Attack Duration]: There is no evidence that
attackers in the replication study spent more or less time on
their attacks than in the original real-world study. In both the
replication study and the real-world study, we did not find a
significant difference of attack duration between touch and mid-
air, and touch and eye gaze. However, attacks on touch and
mid-air in our replication study were notably longer than in the
real-world study [52] (touch: 150.98 s vs 103.9 s [52]; mid-air:
138.80 s vs 91.9 s [52]).
5.3.4 Attackers’ Confidence. When assessing attackers’ level of
confidence, we found a significant effect of the threat model, F1,15
= 252.842, p<0.05, and input method, F2,30 = 284.938, p<0.05. We
also found a significant interaction effect (threat model × input
method), F2,30 = 147.413, p<0.05. Follow-up analysis revealed a
significant main effect of input method on attackers’ confidence
when performing single attacks, F2,30 = 15.838, p<0.05, and repeated-
video attacks, F2,30 = 341.548, p<0.05. In terms of single attacks,
we found significant differences (p<0.05) of attackers’ confidence
between touch (M=1.74, SD=0.48) and mid-air (M=1.33, SD=0.35),
and touch (M=1.74, SD=0.48) and eye gaze (M=1.06, SD=0.14). For
repeated-video attacks, attackers were significantly less confident
about their guesses when PINs were entered with eye gaze (M=1.09,
SD=0.27) compared to touch (M=4.34, SD=0.74) andmid-air (M=4.53,
SD=0.54). We also found that attackers’ confidence was significantly
higher (p<0.05) in repeated-video attacks in case of touch (M=4.34,
SD=0.74) and mid-air (M=4.53, SD=0.54) compared to single attacks
on touch (M=1.74, SD=0.48) and mid-air (M=1.33, SD=0.35). No
other pairs were significant. Results are summarised in Table 1.
Attackers’ confidence together with their notably low successful
attack rate on eye gaze is inline with prior work that emphasises
the high resistance to observations of gaze-based authentication
[28, 46, 61, 68]. When comparing attackers’ confidence between
the two study types, we found a significant three-way interaction
effect (input method × threat model × study type), F1.399,47.582 =
10.485, p<0.05. We also found a statistically significant two-way
interaction effect (input method × study type), F1.620,55.076 = 15.403,
p<0.05. Follow-up analysis revealed a significant difference (p<0.05)
between attackers’ confidence in the real-world and replication
study when attacking mid-air and eye gaze in both threat models.
The values for mid-air in single attacks are M=1.33 (SD=0.35) in VR
and M=2.03 (SD=1.01) in the real world. For eye gaze the values are
M=1.06 (SD=0.14) in VR and M=1.92 (SD=1.04) in the real world. For
repeated-video attacks the values for mid-air are M=4.53 (SD=0.54)
in VR and M=3.71 (SD=1.16) in the real world. The values for eye
gaze are M=1.09 (SD=0.27) in VR and M=2.28 (SD=1.15) in the real
world. We did not find any other statistically significant differences.
Results are summarised in Table 2. Inline with the real-world study,
we found that attackers in repeated-video attacks on touch and
mid-air were more confident than in single attacks. Attackers in
repeated-video attacks on touch and mid-air were also significantly
more confident than in repeated-video attacks on eye gaze — this
was the case for both the real-world study and our replication study.
Observation #9 [Attackers’ Confidence]: There is no evi-
dence that attackers were more confident in attacking touch
in either one of the study types. However, attackers were more
confident in their single-view attacks on mid-air and eye gaze
in the real-world study. They were also more confident when
performing repeated-video attacks on eye gaze in the real world,
but less confident when attacking mid-air.
5.3.5 Qualitative Feedback. Unlike data collected through semi-
structured interviews in the real-world study [52], we relied on
open questions at the end of our online survey. We pre-defined
three main areas of interest as also done in the real-world study
[52]: attackers’ attacking strategy and their security and usability
perception when using the input methods.
Attacking Strategy: Attackers’ attacking strategies in our repli-
cation study match those used in the original real-world study [52]
to a great extent. While the majority mostly noted down the PIN
numbers on a piece of paper, others drew figures or even drew a
sketch of the virtual environment. Participants raised that further
training could help them in running successful attacks. Single-view
attacks on touch andmid-air were perceived as too fast. Participants
found it challenging to switch between the hand movements and
the digits on the screen. Attacks on eye gaze were perceived as too
hard. Participants mentioned they could hardly see the eyes move.
Instead, they guessed the direction of users’ eyes to indicate on
which digit the user gazes at. Others mentioned that the combina-
tion of focusing on users’ eye movements and the screen put them
off. In repeated-video attacks, attackers made use of rewinding and
slowing down the videos. This was mentioned frequently in touch
and mid-air, but not in eye gaze. In mid-air, attackers mentioned
that observing one-handed interactions was easier. Similar to single
attacks on eye gaze, attackers perceived eye gaze as “hard” to attack
and mentioned that slowing down the videos did not help recognise
eye movements. Some attackers reported having a vague idea of
the entered digits, but could not use these information to provide
successful attacks on eye gaze. This is inline with the successful
attack rate (Observation #1 and Section 5.3.1).
Security Perception: Participants found eye gaze the most se-
cure input method, which is inline with our findings in the in-VR
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usability study and the original real-world study [52]. Similar to
the real-world study, opinions differed when asking about the least
secure method: 11 found touch the least secure input method, while
5 found mid-air the least secure input method.
Usability Perception: The feedback we received from the par-
ticipants in the security study aligned with the findings in the in-VR
usability study and the real-world study [52]. Touch was defined as
easy to use, convenient, and most practical. P4 and P6 mentioned
that entering a PIN can be done discreetly by covering up the hands.
On the other hand, P16 mentioned that the on-screen gestures
could linger on the screen after input. Others mentioned touch
input is easy to attack and that people are already used to attack
this input method. Other comments were about the hygiene of the
method. For example, P4 raised the concern about the infection
risk in a post-pandemic world where you have to touch surfaces.
Participants mentioned that providing input with mid-air feels a
bit like being a fool in public and looks strange. Overall, they were
reserved towards the social acceptability of mid-air. For example,
P11 and P12 stated that mid-air reminds them of playing games on
a Nintendo WII or in VR. P14 mentioned that using mid-air feels
like sharing the PIN with everyone around and P12 mentioned that
using such mid-air gestures over-complicates input a lot. Partic-
ipants were reserved towards the usability of eye gaze. Entering
PINs with eye gaze was considered to be hard to use, hard to learn,
and long-winded. P5 mentioned that the concept feels weird. There
were many concerns regarding the accuracy of such a system. For
example, participants mentioned eye gaze could lead to many errors
that could prompt users to go through the authentication process
multiple times. On the positive side, P4 mentioned that eye gaze
could support disabled people when interacting with such systems.
Observation #10 [Qualitative Feedback]:Many of the voiced
comments match those voiced in our in-VR usability study and in
the original real-world study — indicating that users’ perception
of the methods in terms of security and usability remained the
same across the studies and was not influenced by the virtual
avatar and study type.
6 DISCUSSION & FUTUREWORK
Users’ perceptions of the usability and security of the input methods
collected through our studies match to a great extent the percep-
tions of the real-world study participants (Observation #4 and #10).
Our validation also revealed many similarities between the quanti-
tative measures of our VR and the real-world studies. Results are
summarised in Table 2. Similar to the design implications in the
real-world study [52] we can deduce the following implications
from our experiments:
• Design Implication 1: Eye gaze is the most secure input
method, but the slowest (see Table 2). This suggests that eye
gaze is suitable when authentication frequency is low and
subtle authentication is required, which is inline with the
design implication 1 reported in the real-world study [52].
• Design Implication 2:When comparing eye gaze with mid-
air in our in-VR usability and online security study, we also
conclude that mid-air is more usable than eye gaze, but eye
gaze is more secure (see also design implication 2 in [52]).
• Design Implication 3: Our qualitative results suggest mid-
air is not suitable for public spaces (e.g., requires additional
space and “looks like a jumping jack”, P17 ); thus users should
be able to opt for alternative modalities. This finding is also
depicted in [52]’s design implication 3.
While we can deduce the same design implications as found in
the original real-world study [52], there are also measures that do
not match and require further discussions.We discuss the suitability
of using VR to evaluate authentication prototypes in the light of
our findings. We first discuss similarities and differences between
our conceptual VR replication and CueAuth’s usability findings
[52]. We then discuss the impact of using VR avatars in observation
resistance studies by drawing upon our security study results and
conclude with potential research directions.
6.1 In-VR Usability Evaluation: Users’
Performance and Perception
We found similar entry accuracies in all three input methods (Obser-
vation #1) and there is no evidence that users’ perceived workload
was significantly different in our VR study when providing input
with touch and mid-air (Observation #3). However, building upon
the work by De Luca et al. [18] and Knierim et al. [57], our results
suggest that tracking accuracy, in our case hand and eye tracking,
can have a notable impact on a system’s usability. This is apparent
in our study as follows: Compared to the real-world usability study
of CueAuth [52], input using touch was significantly slower in VR,
while input using gaze was significantly faster (Observation #2).
Eye gaze was perceived as significantly less physically demanding,
less frustrating, and required less effort in VR (Observation #3), and
was the most preferred input method in our VR study, whereas it
was the least preferred one in the real-world study (Observation #5).
To summarise, these differences between the real-world and our
VR study show that VR studies do not necessarily provide the often
desired “all-in-one solution” [112] and researchers need to have
a clear vision what they expect from such evaluations as not all
measures may be transferable to the real world; yet, they have lots
of potential for researchers to evaluate and deploy their prototype
systems. We discuss these findings below.
6.1.1 Users’ Virtual Hands: Contrary tomid-air and eye gazewhere
no additional virtual artefacts are required when providing input,
touch requires visualising users’ hands because they leverage the
visual feedback of their hands in the real-world to provide precise
input. The virtual hand then lies between the user and the interac-
tion. This can affect users’ performance; our participants voiced that
the virtual hand did not always map with their real hand. Although
participants associated touch input with many positive attributes
in our VR study, their entries were not as fast as those logged in
the real-world study. This confirms and extends the findings by
Knierim et al. [57] who used OptiTrack cameras for finger tracking
while typing in VR. Their results also showed that users’ typing
performance is affected by the avatar hands [57]. We intentionally
abstained from using an OptiTrack or other high-end sensors be-
cause one of the goals of VR studies is to cut down prototyping
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Table 2: Our in-VR study achieved similar results in terms of users’ entry accuracy and perceived workload compared to the
real-world study. There is no evidence that attackers’ attack rate and attack duration differ significantly between the study
types. However, measures such as entry time, the distance of attackers’ guesses to the correct PINs and their confidence were
significantly different between the two study types. ★ The reported values are for both single and repeated-video attacks with
the notation single | repeated.
Measures Real World [52] VR Measures Real World [52] Observing Virtual Avatars
Entry Accuracy Attack Rate★
Touch 93.38% 89.97% Touch 0.00% | 74% 10.95% | 59.38%
Mid-Air 84.19% 80.42% Mid-Air 0.01% | 64% 0.00% | 59.38%
Eye Gaze 82.72% 83.75% Eye Gaze 0.03% | 0.05% 0.00% | 0.00%
Entry Time Levenshtein Distance★
Touch 3.73 s 6.06 s Touch 2.83 | 0.50 2.03 | 0.59
Mid-Air 5.51 s 5.54 s Mid-Air 2.78 | 0.64 2.94 | 0.83
Eye Gaze 26.35 s 16.75 s Eye Gaze 2.81 | 2.63 3.55 | 3.45
Perceived Workload Attack Duration★
Touch 23.25 34.83 Touch N/A | 103.9 s 103.00 s | 150.98 s
Mid-Air 39.584 34 Mid-Air N/A | 91.9 s 79.68 s | 138.80 s
Eye Gaze 46.54 30.33 Eye Gaze N/A | 163.4 s 63.48 s | 150.54 s
Preferred Input Method Attacker Confidence★
Touch 56 37 Touch 1.89 | 3.75 1.74 | 4.34
Mid-Air 33 41 Mid-Air 2.02 | 3.71 1.33 | 4.53
Eye Gaze 31 45 Eye Gaze 1.92 | 2.28 1.06 | 1.09
expenses. Although such technological limitations may disappear
due to improved finger tracking and acquaintance of users with VR,
they also suggest that VR may sometimes not be able to provide
users with exactly the same experience they would face in reality
(e.g., [89]).
6.1.2 The Consequences of Improved Eye Tracking Systems: Con-
trary to the real-world study, participants in our VR study preferred
eye gaze over the other methods (Observation #5) and provided
faster entries than in the original real-world study (Observation
#2). This difference in performance and perception of gaze is due
to the different eye tracking systems used. In the real-world study,
Khamis et al. [52] used a stationary eye tracker mounted at the
bottom of the display. This likely resulted in the eye tracking qual-
ity being influenced by the user’s height, distance to the display,
and the ambient and lighting conditions in the room. These are
known problems in studies that involve stationary eye trackers
[17, 51, 76]. In fact, the authors of CueAuth admit that “error rates
and entry times are influenced by [their] setup and implementation”
[52]. In our case, we used an eye tracker that is integrated in the
head-mounted display. This meant that many of the artefacts that
typically reduce eye tracking quality were absent in our VR study.
For example, eye tracking in our study was independent of the
user’s position, their height, and the surrounding lighting condi-
tions. This explains why users were faster and preferred using eye
gaze in the VR study. However, it is important to note that our find-
ings were also dependent on the technology used in our replication
study and in the original real-world evaluation of CueAuth [52];
a more advanced stationary eye tracker than the one used in the
original real-world study [52] may achieve results similar to those
found in our replication study. Our findings also show that VR
studies could help mitigate limitations of hardware used in the real
world, but could also be misleading. For example, if a researcher
wants to assess the usability of gaze-based authentication assuming
ideal tracking conditions, then VR would help them achieve that.
On the downside, if a researcher wants to assess the usability of
the same scheme with noise and other external factors put into
consideration, then they would need to account for these factors in
VR, or otherwise risk being mislead into thinking that the scheme
works better than it actually does.
There are similar trade-offs that HCI and USEC researchers have
traditionally considered when comparing lab and field studies, with
one optimising for control while the other optimising for ecological
validity. What is important to note here is that transferability
of quantitative results from VR to the real world highly de-
pends on how well reality and its limitations are emulated.
It is also important to recognise that VR studies are not an alter-
native to lab or field studies, but rather can complement them
by enabling large-scale evaluations and cost-efficient prototyping.
6.2 Attackers’ Performance in Online Security
Studies and the Use of Virtual Avatars
Voit et al. [104] observed that participants in their online method
were less engaged than in studies where a researcher was present.
The poor performance of six participants in our security study
suggests that this phenomenon (see also [16]) was also present
in our security study. Data quality is one of the major concerns
when using online crowd-sourcing platforms [78]. In our security
study, we recruited the same number of participants (N=22) as
in the real-world security study of CueAuth [52]. While in the
original work the authors excluded two participants due to their
poor performance (0 out of 24 attacks were successful), we excluded
six participants due to the same reason. We could find repetitive
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guesses throughout the survey (e.g., “1234”) and repeatedly wrongly
answered control questions, indicating that some participants did
not participate meaningfully in the study. This suggests that the
22 participants in the real-world CueAuth study [52] felt more
committed to their participation than in our online study, which
extends the findings by Clifford et al. [13] and Voit et al. [104] who
found significant differences in distractions between online and
lab studies [13] and that online surveys receive significantly more
low-quality responses (e.g., lower word counts) than real-world
studies [104]. Our online security study emphasises the importance
of filtering out these low-quality responses in security studies and
extends the findings by Redmiles et al. [85] and Fahl et al. [24]
who argue that the ecological validity can be improved by filtering
out such cases. After excluding the six participants, our security
study results indeed match with the real-world evaluation to a great
extent. There is no evidence that the successful attack rates differ
significantly between the two study types (Observation #6), the
performance of attacks against the different input methods followed
the same pattern across both studies, and significant differences
were found between the same pairs in VR and the real-world. While
more general measures such as attackers’ successful attack rate
(Observation #6) match between the study types, more specific
measures such as the Levenshtein distance differ (Observation #7).
To summarise, researchers should be aware of low-quality
responses when conducting security evaluations online, but
a well-defined exclusion criteria contributes to receiving re-
search findings that are highly transferable to the real world.
The results also show that observing virtual avatars during au-
thentication reveals insights about how resistant the used
scheme is against observations. The idea of using virtual avatars
instead of humans in evaluations raises interesting directions for
future work. For example, avatars can be programmed to mimic
movements of users with disabilities or conditions that impact their
mobility e.g., Parkinson’s disease, or users that are challenging
to recruit e.g., children. The use of avatars to simulate these user
groups makes VR studies promising in cases where recruitment is
challenging due to ethical or logistic reasons; yet, it is researchers’
responsibility to act ethically and morally [10, 97].
6.3 VR Studies for Human-centred Usability,
Privacy, and Security Research
In this work, we focused on authentication as a sub-domain of
USEC research. However, USEC research covers much more in-
cluding privacy on IoT devices [65, 93, 113], users’ perception of
technologies (e.g., drones [12]) and how they affect privacy and
security, or social engineering [36, 59]. Based on the results and our
experience conducting this work, we discuss two potential research
directions where we see great potential of VR studies as a study
method. Our work lays the foundation for future user studies ex-
ploring the potential of VR studies for usable privacy and security
research. Follow-up research should consider replication studies
similar to our work to draw further insights about the strengths
and weaknesses of VR studies.
6.3.1 Virtual Field Studies: Mäkelä et al. [64], Savino et al. [89],
and Voit et al. [104] have taken the first steps towards using VR as
a research method for virtual human-centred studies. A promising
next step could be a combination of virtual field studies [64, 89],
virtual artefacts [104], and authentication as studied in our work.
How can we incorporate all the benefits of field studies into human-
centred evaluations while eliminating their additional costs and
complexity? There are many authentication schemes (e.g., [19, 53])
that were studied without the potential effect of external factors
such as bystanders or vivid contexts. How does user’s behaviour
translate to the real world when interacting with authentication
systems in a more vivid environment in VR? While such virtual
field studies would not replace real-world field studies, they have
the benefit of (a) decreasing the additional costs researchers face
when going “into the wild” (e.g., costs of hardware prototyping,
booking access to specific locations); (b) eliminating confounding
variables that are hard to pinpoint in real-world field studies such
as the impact of bystanders or different lighting conditions; and (c)
they may enable researchers to conduct research in contexts that
are otherwise challenging due to ethical or legal constraints.
One concrete application could be to study novel authentication
systems at ATMs and the impact of bystanders on corresponding
user authentications. Do users provide faster entries, but makemore
errors when they feel being observed by a virtual character? VR
could also transform physical labs into smart home environments
that can enable researchers to investigate user behaviour in more
ecologically valid settings. For example, when interacting with IoT
devices to study users’ awareness [94] or to study users’ perception
of different authentication mechanisms at doors [71]. Using VR
studies for such evaluations can be particularly valuable as they
can immerse users into different contexts. Participants in lab studies
often manifest “demand characteristics” where they subconsciously
change their behaviour to fit the experimenter’s purpose [21, 86]
(Hawthorne effect [2]). In human-centred privacy and security re-
search, researchers often rely on cameras to record user interactions
for follow-up evaluations (e.g., [7, 8, 18]). In such cases, participants
are often aware of the recording devices and the presence of the
experimenter who often shares the same physical space. In contrast,
one of our participants, P13, voiced that she was totally unaware
of the experimenter during our in-VR usability study. VR studies of
that type could shed more light on the Hawthorne effect [2] within
and beyond USEC research.
6.3.2 Remote VR Studies: Another promising research direction
is to conduct fully remote VR studies. For example, the hardware
used in our studies has become more accessible and affordable
in the past (e.g., the HTC VIVE Pro Eye [42]) — making it more
likely to encounter such devices in many households in the near
future. While we conducted only our security study online, moving
the usability study to a fully remote VR experience would not
require much additional effort. As done in our in-VR usability study,
questionnaires can be integrated into the VR experience without
much effort [4, 81], material such as the participant information
sheet can be distributed in advance of the study, and semi-structured
interviews can be done via videotelephony. Remote VR studies could
enable large-scale human-centred usability, privacy, and security
evaluations of replications of physical prototypes.
This approach is deemed promising beyond USEC research; for
example, recent suggestions in running user studies that involve vir-
tual and augmented reality amidst COVID-19 include collaborations
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across labs to provide participants for each other’s experiments,
and building an infrastructure that provides equipment to a pool of
participants [95].
7 LIMITATIONS
It is important to consider the following technological and experi-
mental design limitations when interpreting our findings. First, we
studied and replicated only one real-world authentication scheme
(CueAuth [52]) and showed through two user studies that VR can
serve as a suitable test-bed for the usability and security evalua-
tion. Although we studied the usability and security of a breadth
of input methods that are frequently used in security research:
touch [19, 107], mid-air [1, 6], and eye gaze [20, 46, 61], it is im-
portant to note that substantial future research (e.g., additional
replication studies, replications using participants’ own VR head-
sets) is necessary to be able to generalise our results to a larger set
of authentication systems and other usable privacy and security
systems. Second, the security evaluation is based on two specific
threat models: 1) single observation attacks and 2) repeated video
attacks. In both the replication study and the real-world study [52]
the attacks were single-person attacks through optimal views on
the authentication scheme and the interaction – this depicts a best
case scenario for the attacker. Using non-optimal or user-defined
views, or more advanced threat models (e.g., multiple observers
[48]), could result in different findings. Third, following Khamis et
al.’s [52] study design means facing the same limitations. CueAuth’s
evaluation was dependent on the used hardware in both the real-
world and our VR study. Other hardware such as OptiTrack systems
could have lead to more accurate tracking. However, if (remote)
VR studies are to become mainstream, they have to leverage per-
sonal commodity hardware that a typical VR user would have. It
is unlikely that average VR users will own a high-end tracking
systems like OptiTrack. Finally, replication studies are generally
challenging [109]; the largest replication study to date attempted
to replicate 100 studies and succeeded only in 39% of them [14].
Human test subjects consciously or sub-consciously remember pre-
vious experiences that can impact their thoughts, behaviour, and
performance; thus, experiments can result in different results due
to the non-uniformity of nature [35, 90]. While the original work
was published in 2018 [52], our studies were conducted two years
later during a pandemic [77] — which has to be noted.
8 CONCLUSION
Currently used empirical methods for evaluating physical authenti-
cation systems are not suitable for large-scale usable privacy and
security research that involves non-commodity hardware. Deploy-
ing physical authentication prototypes to, for example, evaluate a
system’s usability and security and understand users’ behaviour
during interactions makes studies of that type often costly and
time consuming. Given this motivation, we conducted a conceptual
replication study of a real-world authentication system, CueAuth
[52], and investigated the suitability of Virtual Reality (VR) studies
to evaluate the usability and security of real-world authentication
systems. We report on results from a lab-based in-VR usability
study (N=20) and an online security study through VR recordings
(N=22). Our lab-based in-VR usability study suggests that many
usability measures of VR studies are transferable to the real world.
For example, users achieved similar entry accuracies, reported sim-
ilar perceived workload when authenticating with touch, mid-air,
and eye gaze, and shared a similar security perception of the input
methods across our VR study and the original real-world study
[52]. However, notable longer entries in VR were found when using
touch — indicating that introducing virtual artefacts, through, for
example, finger tracking can have a negative impact on users’ per-
formance while wearable eye trackers instead of static eye trackers
can have a positive impact on users’ performance. We observed
great similarities between our security study where attackers per-
formed observations on a virtual avatar compared to observations
on a human in the real world [52]. Attack rates do not significantly
differ, and there is no evidence that attackers spent more or less
time on their attacks in our online study compared to the real-world
study. However, measures like the accuracy of attackers’ guesses
and their confidence differed significantly between the two study
types, with users in the real-world study being closer to correct
guesses on eye gaze, but not when performing single-view attacks
on touch. Through this work, we provide insights into the potential,
strengths, and current weaknesses of using VR for holistic usability
and security evaluations of real-world authentication schemes. Our
results suggest studies of that type can have a number of advan-
tages over traditional evaluation methods such as lab, online, or
field studies, but studies of that nature also come with limitations
that need to be kept in mind.
Through our investigation of using VR as a test-bed for real-
world authentication schemes we hope to open the door for follow-
up research to establish VR studies as a fundamental evaluation
paradigm in research on authentication prototypes and related
USEC research domains.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Semi-structured Interview Questions
Our semi-structured interviews in the usability study were loosely
guided by the following questions that were asked for all three
input methods: touch, mid-air, and eye gaze.
(1) General Questions
• Please tell us how you would feel using this method in
public.
• Please tell us (a) what you liked; and (b) what you did not
like when using this method.
• Is there anything in particular that you would like to im-
prove in this method?
• Have you used this method previously? If yes, where?
• How did you feel when interacting with the input method?
Would you define it as a positive or negative experience?
(2) VR-specific Questions [Please consider the situation where
you interact with the authentication scheme you have just
experienced in the real world.]
• Can you please walk us through the input method and tell
us what differences may appear when using this method
in the real world rather than in VR as just experienced?
• Do you think the virtual environment affected you in the
way you provided input with the method?
At the end, we asked participants if they have any additional
comments, questions, or suggestions.
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